Issue #30

Abstract: Luhmann’s theory of double distinction is a cross-cutting theme that runs through the entire sociological heritage of the outstanding German sociologist. Since this theory is not a subject of sociology and goes far beyond its scope, it is natural that its essential consideration does not have to be sociological. In this regard, in the process of studying Luhmann’s texts, one way or another, a contradiction arises between the collaboration representing the problem and the problem itself. What is its essence in short? We distinguish between something as such in itself — singular and indivisible, without experiencing any existential difficulties. But as soon as we intend to discern the very distinction, we immediately find ourselves in a turbulence of forms and identifications, measures and dimensions, along the way losing our own, once unshakable, observer position. A situation of uncertainty arises, pushing towards this or that choice, to this or that commitment as to something definite. Luhmann seeks to overcome the intention of commitment. The result is a dynamic panorama of continuously related distinctive acts. This is perhaps the most difficult passage not only in Luhmann, but also in the theory of distinction in his double dynamic perspective. The difficulty is to describe how it is possible to relate to what is itself as a result of the relationship. According to Luhmann any definite differentiated — is act in act, movement within movement, time within time, subject within subject, life in life, relationship within relationship, etc. No matter what we are talking about, we are always talking about a double perspective of differentiation.